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NOTES
An Approach to Acts of State: Empresa Cuban
Exportadora de Azucar y Sus Derivados v.
Lamborn & Co.
According to the act of state doctrine, lawsuits regarding the acts of
a foreign nation in its own territory are not justiciable in United States
courts. The doctrine has generated much controversy in the legislative,
executive, judicial, and academic arenas. In the leading case, Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,I the United States Supreme Court ruled that
American property expropriated by Cuba could not be recovered
through the federal courts; however, the effect of this decision and its
various "exceptions" has led to considerable uncertainty in the courts as
to the parameters of the act of state doctrine. The lack of a definitive
policy is certain to have significant impact on cases yet to reach the
courts concerning foreign seizures of American property by emerging
powers and by nations undergoing economic and political change.
The present case of Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Azucary Sus Der-
ivados v. Lamborn & Co.2 presents a concise review of the act of state doc-
trine and its legislative and judicial exceptions. After considering the
doctrine and each exception in turn, the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that a counterclaim asserted against a Cuban governmental
entity and a direct third party claim against the Republic of Cuba, both
based on expropriation of American property, were barred by the act of
state doctrine, 3 since neither claim qualified as an exception to the doc-
trine. 4 The court's method of analysis has far reaching implications for
the development of international law in the area of foreign
expropriations.
In 1960 the defendant Lamborn & Co., as sugar broker for a private
American concern, purchased sugar from the plaintiff, Empresa Cubana
de Azucar y Sus Derivados, a wholly-owned governmental entity serving
as Cuba's official, sugar merchant. 5 The defendant failed to pay a five
1 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
2 652 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1981).
3 Id. at 233.
4 See the court's discussion of each exception, id. at 237-38.
5 Id. at 233.
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percent balance due. 6 The assets of the company which had employed
Lamborn & Co. were seized pursuant to a request from the Cuban Min-
ister of Labor, who had determined that the company was discontinuing
operations in Cuba. 7 The value of the assets seized exceeded the amount
of the balance owed to the Cuban seller.8
In 1961 the Republic of Cuba filed an action in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York to recover on the debt owed by Lamborn. 9 In 1979 the
Republic of Cuba amended its complaint to substitute Empresa Ex-
portadora, Cuba's official sugar merchant, as plaintiff. 10 Lamborn
sought to assert a counterclaim or setoff based on the value of the prop-
erty seized by the Cuban government and therefore also filed a third-
party claim against the Republic of Cuba. The district court dismissed
the counterclaim on the basis of New York statutesII and one of its prior
decisions.' 2 The court dismissed the third-party claim as it was barred
by the act of state doctrine.' 3
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower
court decision solely on the basis of the act of state doctrine.14 The direct
claim against Cuba was held barred as a "classic act of state,' 5 involv-
ing a seizure of assets by a governmental official acting pursuant to for-
mal resolution issued in compliance with Cuban law. 16 Recovery on the
counterclaim was held precluded by the act of state doctrine as enunci-
ated and applied in Sabbaitno. 17 The Sabbatino court had recognized that
there is an exception to the act of state doctrine when the presence "of a
treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal prin-
ciples"' 8 allows judicial examination of an expropriation. This exception
could not apply in Lamborn, however, because there was no agreement
between the United States and Cuba defining circumstances under
6 Id.
7 Id. at 234.
8 Lamborn owed $32,088 on its sugar purchase. Among the assets seized was a bank
account worth $91,358. Id. at 233-34.
9 Id. at 233.
10 Id. See Republic ofCuba v. Lamborn & Co., No. 61 Civ. 1847 - CLB (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1,
1979).
'' 652 F.2d at 235. The court of appeals ruled that since Craig, owner of the assets seized
by the Cuban government, and Lamborn, to whom Craig assigned its claim, had been closely
affiliated throughout the transactions involved in the instant suit, Lamborn's actions did not
violate the anti-champerty statutes of New York. N.Y. Jud. §§ 489, 495 (McKinney 1968 &
Supp. 1981) (prohibiting the purchase of claims by a corporation if it intends to bring suit
thereon). 652 F.2d at 236.
12 652 F.2d at 234. The court of appeals indicated that the lower court felt bound by its
decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (construing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 406 U.S. 759 (1972)).
13 652 F.2d at 233.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 237.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 376 U.S. at 428.
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which expropriation without compensation was permissible.' 9 The Hick-
enlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,20 which di-
rects the courts to disregard the act of state doctrine if the act
complained of violates international law, was held inapplicable because
of prior decisions in the Second Circuit, which restricted application of
the Amendment to cases in which the expropriated property was present
in the United States.2' The court declined to apply the "Bernstein Ex-
ception" 22 to the act of state doctrine, under which the Executive Branch
may direct the courts to disregard an act of state defense, 23 because the
Executive Branch did not express any opinion regarding the appropriate-
ness of applying the act of state doctrine in the instant case. 24 Moreover,
the court rejected the "commercial exception" outlined in A/fred Dunhill
of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,25 since the seizure of the assets was a
governmental action in response to a labor problem rather than a mer-
cantile transaction.26 The appellate court in Lamborn summarized its de-
cision by stating that the act of state doctrine is a matter of United States
substantive law which a foreign sovereign plaintiff may invoke just as
any other affirmative defense. 27 The court noted that the result may be
inequitable because a foreign state plaintiff may collect on a direct claim
while avoiding liability on a counterclaim. 2 8 Thus, in Lamborn, the Cu-
ban government not only seized defendant's property but also collected
on defendant's debt, without having to offset the expropriation against
the indebtedness.
Although the result in Lamborn appears inequitable, it is in harmony
with the longstanding rule of law which insulates the actions of a foreign
sovereign in its own territory from inquiry by courts of another sovereign
state. The act of state doctrine was first promulgated by the Supreme
Court in Underhill v. Hernandez,29 in which the Court recognized that
governmental acts by a sovereign within its own territory are not subject
19 652 F.2d at 237.
20 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 301(d)(3), 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2)(1976).
21 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 383 F.2d
166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968), and Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First
National Bank of New York, 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 406 U.S. 759
(1972).
22 See Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210
F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954); Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d
Cir. 1947).
23 652 F.2d at 237.
24 Id. at 237-38.
25 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
26 652 F.2d at 238.
27 Id. at 239.
28 Id.
29 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897):
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sover-
eign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of
government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by
reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by
sovereign powers as between themselves.
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to adjudication by the courts of another sovereign nation. The doctrine
is a rule of deference applied by domestic courts and has been defended
as a way of "institutionalizing respect for diverse social and economic
policies."'30
Executive influence on the judicially-created act of state doctrine
increased in the 1940's in the famous Bernstein litigation in the Second
Circuit.3 1 Concerns of the Executive Branch had been foreshadowed
earlier by the Supreme Court, 32 but the expropriations of the Nazi re-
gime in Germany prompted affirmative executive action in the post-
World War II Bernstein cases. These cases gave rise to the "Bernstein
Exception" to the act of state doctrine, under which a supervening ex-
pression of executive policy may disallow an act of state defense by a
foreign government. 33 The Supreme Court explicitly recognized the dis-
cretionary role of the executive and legislative branches in the resolution
of issues concerning foreign relations in Baker v. Carr,34 particularly in
situations where a single-voiced statement of the government's position is
necessary. 35
The leading judicial pronouncement of the act of state doctrine in
the United States came in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino ,36 a case
arising from the 1960 Cuban nationalization of property owned by
United States nationals. The Cuban government seized the property in
retaliation for the United States' reduction of Cuba's sugar quota. The
United States Supreme Court applied the act of state doctrine to bar a
counterclaim against Cuba, despite the possibility that the expropriation
decree violated international law.3 7 The Court reversed the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals,38 which had held that the Cuban expropriation
decree violated international law and that two letters from the State De-
partment indicated the Executive Branch had no objection to a judicial
testing of the validity of the expropriation decree and would not com-
ment on the case. 39 The oft-quoted holding of Sabbatino clearly deline-
30 R. Falk, Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order 7 n.12 (1964).
31 See 210 F.2d at 375; 163 F.2d at 246.
32 See Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918). See also Ricaud v. American
Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
33 See 163 F.2d at 251, where L. Hand notes that evidence of some "positive intent [of the
Executive Branch] to relax the [act of state] doctrine" is necessary before the court will disallow
an act of state defense. See also R. Falk, supra note 30, at 104, for a discussion of Bernstein and
the diminished prospects of judicial independence for domestic courts.
34 369 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1962) (dictum).
35 Courts have the power to construe executive statements, however, and to decide
whether a statute applies to a given act once a foreign government has been officially recognized
by the Executive Branch. Id. at 212-13.
36 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
37 Id. at 439. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375, 379 (S.D.N.Y.
1961). The district court found the expropriation decree to violate international law because of
retaliatory motive, discrimination against American nationals, and failure to provide adequate
compensation, and granted summary judgment against the petitioners.
38 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
39 376 U.S. at 420.
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ates the proposition that the courts will not inquire into the legality of
acts of state. 40
The Sabbatino Court did not find it necessary to pass on the validity
of the Bernstein Exception, distinguishing Sabbalino on the basis that the
Nazi government at the time of the Bernstein cases was not in existence
at the time suit was brought.4' The Court also noted that the two letters
involved in Sabbalrzo merely expressed the State Department's wish not
to make a statement at all with respect to the litigation, while the Bern-
stein letter affirmatively relieved U.S. courts of any restraints imposed by
the act of state doctrine.4 2 The Court, speaking through Justice Harlan
for an 8-1 majority, stated that the vitality of the act of state doctrine
"depends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of functions
between the judicial and political branches of the Government on mat-
ters bearing upon foreign affairs."'43 Emphasizing the possible danger
resulting from conflicts between the Judiciary and the Executive Branch
if the courts should attempt to adjudicate claims involving foreign acts of
state, 44 the Court advanced the position that it is the function of the
Executive to secure appropriate relief for United States citizens harmed
by foreign expropriations. 4 5 Justice Harlan expressly rejected the sugges-
tion that the act of state doctrine should not be applied when interna-
tional law is violated unless the Executive Branch expressly directs that it
should apply.46 Instead, Justice Harlan expressed the view that acts of
state are automatically protected from judicial inquiry, regardless of the
nature of the acts.4 7
The other major issue addressed in Sabbalino was whether the act of
state defense is appropriate when the foreign government is the plaintiff
40 Id. at 428:
[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property within
its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and recognized by this
country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agree-
ment regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the
taking violates customary international law.
41 Id. See, however, Cheatham and Maier, Private International Law and its Sources, 22
Vand. L. Rev. 27, 91 (1968), commenting on Sabbatino: "[T]he rationale upon which [the
Supreme Court's] decision was based would clearly include the possibility of executive waiver of
the doctrine where this was politically useful." The Court declined to examine the validity of
the Bernstein exception per se, although it recognized that the political interests of the U.S. may
be significantly affected if a foreign government who committed an act of state no longer exists.
376 U.S. at 428.
42 376 U.S. at 419-20. See also id. at 419 n.18, for the relevant text of the Bernstein letter.
43 Id. at 427-28.
44 Id. at 433.
45 Id. at 431. The Court suggests that diplomatic channels and economic and political
sanctions are appropriate methods of redress to be advanced by the Executive Branch in settle-
ment of claims of U.S. citizens against foreign governments when acts of state are involved.
46 Id. at 436.
47 Id. See the sole dissent by Justice White, which asserts that cases involving violations of
international law should be decided on the merits, based on international law, in the absence of
an executive declaration that adjudication would interfere with the conduct of international
relations. Justice White therefore expressly rejects the presumption espoused by the majority
that the act of state doctrine applies in any given case. Id. at 462.
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and a counterclaim is asserted based on an act of state. The Court stated
that the status of a foreign state as plaintiff has no effect on the applica-
bility of the doctrine. 48 An analogy to the area of sovereign immunity,
where counterclaims against a foreign state plaintiff have been held per-
missible, 49 was distinguished by the Court, because sovereign immunity
relates to the prerogative right of a sovereign not to be subject to suit,
while the act of state doctrine concerns limits for determining the valid-
ity of an otherwise applicable rule of law.50
Congress, outraged at the Sabbatino decision because it had the effect
of upholding the Cuban expropriation, 5' promptly enacted the Hick-
enlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, specifically
directing the courts to disregard the act of state doctrine if acts com-
plained of violate international law, unless the President otherwise di-
rects. 52 Without this congressional directive, in light of Sabbatino, the
courts would have been unable to rule on international law in act of state
cases, unless the Bernstein Exception were invoked. 53 On remand, the
Sabbatno case resulted in a judgment for the defendant, based on the
Hickenlooper Amendment. 54
Eight years after Sabbatino, the Supreme Court again ruled on the
scope of the act of state doctrine in First Natnal City Bank v. Banco Na-
cional de Cuba, 55 often referred to as Citibank, in which a setoff was al-
48 Id. at 437-39. The Court notes that the plaintiff status of a foreign government actually
heightens the possibility of adversely affecting foreign relations and embarrassing the President.
49 See National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955). The Court utilized
the concept of "fair dealing" in rationalizing the implied waiver of sovereign immunity with
respect to counterclaims if a foreign state avails itself of U.S. courts, regardless of the subject
matter of the counterclaim. Id. at 364-65. A dissent by three Justices asserted that immunity is
not thus waived, and that the majority sanctioned a "circuitous evasion of the well-established
rule prohibiting direct suits against foreign sovereigns." Id. at 372. The dissent took the posi-
tion that sovereign immunity is not a fit subject for the courts and that it was the function of the
other branches of the government to determine public policy in carrying out foreign affairs. Id.
at 371. See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
50 376 U.S. at 438.
51 President Kennedy, in an act which reflected prevailing popular sentiment, had de-
clared an embargo on all trade with Cuba. Proclamation No. 3447, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (1962),
reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (1976).
52 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-565, § 301(d)(3), 78 Stat. 1012-13 (1962)
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976)). The Amendment specifically states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United States shall
decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination
on the merits giving effect to the principles of international law. . . by an act
of. . . state in violation of the principles of international law, including the prin-
ciples of compensation ...
A proviso allows application of the doctrine upon request of the President. Id. The Act thus
approves of Justice White's position in dissent in Sabbatino. 376 U.S. at 462.
53 See Cooper, Act of State and Sovereign Immunity: A Further Inquiry, II Loy. U. Chi.
LJ. 193, 232 (1980).
54 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aft'd, 383 F.2d
(2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
55 406 U.S. 759 (1972). Cuba sued for the excess resulting from the sale of its collateral for
a loan made by Citibank. The sale took place after the seizure of all the bank branches located
in Cuba. The State Department indicated that the act of state doctrine should not be applied
to prevent the assertion of Citibank's counterclaim.
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lowed against a claim brought by a Cuban governmental entity. Four
widely divergent opinions were filed, of which no single proposition com-
manded a majority. The opinion filed by Justice Rehnquist, joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice White, asserted that the judiciary may
decide a case if there is a communication from the Executive Branch that
the act of state doctrine should not or need not be applied, thus recogniz-
ing the Bernstein Exception. 56 Justice Douglas, concurring, would have
decided the case on the basis of "fair dealing," 57 requiring recognition of
any counterclaim or setoff that eliminates or reduces a claim asserted by
a sovereign nation in United States courts.5 8 Justice Powell concurred
on the ground that Sabbatino was overbroad59 and that courts are obliged
to hear cases involving violations of international law without having to
wait for the Executive Branch to speak.60 The four dissenters, speaking
through Justice Brennan, disapproved of the Bernstein Exception, con-
sidering it to be an abdication of judicial responsibility.6'
The nondefinitive nature of the decision in Citibank did little to clar-
ify the status of the act of state doctrine. As one commentator has ob-
served, .the effect of the decision is the same as if certiorari had been
denied. 62
The Supreme Court again addressed the act of state doctrine in AL-
fred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba .63 The Court refused to
apply the doctrine because Cuba had failed to prove an act of state.64
The effect of this decision was to allow a counterclaim and affirmative
56 Id. at 767. The Rehnquist opinion distinquishes Sabbatino, where the Executive took no
position. In Citibank there was a State Department communication regarding the case, indicat-
ing that the Supreme Court should try the case on the merits, stating that "The Department of
State believes that the act of state doctrine should not be applied to bar consideration of a
defendant's counterclaim or setoff against the Government of Cuba in this or like cases." Letter
from John R. Stevenson to E. Robert Seaver, Nov. 17, 1970, cited in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
First National City Bank, 442 F.2d 530, 538 (2d Cir. 1971).
57 406 U.S. at 772.
58 Id. at 771. Justice Douglas adopted the reasoning of National City Bank v. Republic of
China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955), stating that foreign nations who ask the aid of U.S. courts in collect-
ing debts should be subject to counterclaims in the interests of fairness. Interestingly, Justice
Rehnquist notes that the result in Citibank is "consonant with the principles of equity" set forth
in National City Bank v. Republic of China, although his decision is not based on these
grounds. 406 U.S. at 768. See also then-Circuit Judge Burger's dissent in Pons v. Republic of
Cuba, 294 F.2d 925, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1961), where he urges that since Cuba had filed a claim in
equity for an injunction and an accounting from a Cuban national in possession of Cuban
property, Cuba should comply with the doctrines of equity and render an accounting to the
plaintiff, who had counterclaimed for the value of property seized by Cuba. (The majority had
dismissed the counterclaim on the basis of the act of state doctrine.)
59 406 U.S. at 771.
60 See id. at 775-76.
61 Id. at 778.
62 Lowenfeld, Act of State and Department of State: First National City Bank v. Banco Na-
cionalde Cuba, 66 Am. J. Int'l L. 795, 803 (1972).
63 425 U.S. 682 (1976). Interventors failed to repay funds mistakenly paid to them by
American importers after the nationalization of their concerns in Cuba. The payment was for
shipments made prior to the nationalization.
64 The interventors only proved commercial rather than sovereign authorization. Id. at
692-93. No formal decree or resolution of the Cuban government was shown. Id. at 695.
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relief, as contrasted with the allowance of only a setoff in Citibank. Jus-
tice White, joined by three other Justices, advanced the theory that the
act of state doctrine should not be extended to acts in the course of
purely commercial operations, 65 based on the same rationale taken in the
restrictive approach to sovereign immunity, as later codified by the For-
eign Federal Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.66 In Justice White's
view, because sovereign immunity and acts of state are linked as asser-
tions of sovereignty, they should have the same effect when claims arise
out of purely commercial acts.6 7 Citing Sabbatino, he stated that the pur-
pose of the act of state doctrine is to prevent embarrassment to the Exec-
utive Branch by precluding court determination of the legality of acts of
foreign nations in their own territory.6a
Justice Marshall, joined in dissent by three Justices, disagreed with
the linkage of sovereign immunity and acts of state and distinguished the
policies served by the two doctrines.69 The dissenters argued that Cuba's
action qualified as an act of state, but they would have allowed a setoff
under the Citibank holding.
In summary, three exceptions to the act of state doctrine have been
recognized in Supreme Court opinions: the existence of "a treaty or
other unambiguous agreement" regarding the applicable law when for-
eign property is expropriated, approved by eight Justices in Sabbatino; the
65 Id. at 705.
66 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976). The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act restricted sover-
eign immunity to suits involving public acts and did not extend immunity to suits based on
commercial or private acts. The purpose of the Act was to let the courts exclusively decide
questions of sovereign immunity rather than allowing the State Department to intervene as was
the prior practice. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 6604, 6605. The report makes clear that § 1605(a)(3) treating expropriation
claims in violation of international law does not affect situations where the act of state doctrine
is applicable, since the section only deals with issues of immunity. Id. at 19, reprinted in 1976
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6618. The report also indicates, however, that characterizing a
commercial act as an act of state would frustrate the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity by
letting sovereign immunity reenter through the back door (citing Dunhil with approval). Id. at
20, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6619.
For examples of cases dealing with sovereign immunity and executive intervention prior to
1976, see Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961); Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v.
President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 197 1); Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General,
336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965) (definitive guidelines for applica-
tion of sovereign immunity suggested, although exception of executive suggestion of immunity
was recognized).
67 425 U.S. at 705. See Gordon, The Origin and Development of the Act of State Doc-
trine, 8 Rut.-Cam. L.J. 595, 616 (1975) for an argument that the ultimate effect of Dunh/t/ will
be to merge the concepts of sovereign immunity and act of state.
68 425 U.S. at 697.
69 Id. at 725-26, 728. The dissent characterizes sovereign immunity as concerned only
with status and a foreign state's exemption from suit by virtue of its status. Policies served by
the act of state doctrine are independent, however, and concern the competency of branches of
government to make certain kinds of decisions in the international arena. The dissent also notes
that the validity of acts may be political questions not cognizable in the courts, and that the
Executive has the power to effect a fair remedy for U.S. citizens. The dissent therefore con-
cludes that, in view of the differing policies underlying the two doctrines, exceptions to sover-
eign immunity should not be automatically applied to acts of state.
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Bernstein Exception, approved by three Justices in Citibank; and the
"9commercial exception," approved by four Justices in Dunhill.
Against the background of these conflicting and nondefinitive
Supreme Court decisions, the Lamborn court rejected the assertion of a
counterclaim against a Cuban governmental entity by a process of
enumerating and then dismissing as inapplicable the exceptions to the
act of state doctrine. Although only the Sabbatino "treaty" exception has
been pronounced as valid by a majority of the Supreme Court,70 the
Lamborn court nonetheless accorded each exception equal precedential
value by not distinguishing Supreme Court decisions with plurality opin-
ions. Although a lower court is not free to ignore the law as promulgated
by the highest judicial body, it is nonetheless appropriate for a lower
court to expressly recognize that a given area of law is in need of further
explication. If the Lamborn court had mentioned, for example, that the
Bernstein Exception has been recognized by only three Justices and the
commercial exception by four Justices, then the present nondefinitive
status of exceptions to the act of state doctrine would be clear. The Lam-
born court's mechanical approach of listing and testing each exception
accorded status to the Bernstein and commercial exceptions equal to the
"treaty" exception of the majority Sabbatino Court. 7 1 Since the act of
state doctrine as announced in Sabbatino has already been extended to
acts of conversion and breach of contract by a foreign government in its
own territory,7 2 the danger of lower court extension of the exceptions
which are not grounded in Supreme Court majority opinions is a danger
to be recognized. Lower courts, therefore, should acknowledge the need
for Supreme Court review and clarification of the act of state doctrine by
expressly recognizing the lack of strong precedent in this area of the law.
The Lamborn court, in the final paragraph of its decision, noted the
"inequity" of permitting a sovereign state to collect on its direct claim
while being able to avoid a counterclaim based on its uncompensated
expropriation of the defendant's property. 73 The court's attitude reflects
the feeling that, but for the act of state doctrine, courts could adjudicate
the validity of foreign seizures. Rather than viewing the doctrine itself as
an application of international law, such a judicial attitude implies that
domestic courts are competent to judge international issues involving ex-
propriations. A noted commentator observes that the "[l]aw is best ap-
70 The proviso in Sabbatino that prevents the courts from examining the validity of foreign
expropriations "in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding control-
ling legal principles," 376 U.S. at 428, is not in issue in Lambom since no such agreement is
involved.
71 The Lamborn case on its facts could have been decided solely on the basis of Sabbafino,
since in both cases the expropriations were official acts of state and in neither case did the
Executive Branch indicate that the act of state doctrine be disregarded.
72 See French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704, 295 N.Y.S.2d
433 (1968). See also Conant, The Act of State Doctrine and Its Exceptions: An Introduction, 12
Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 259 (1979).
73 652 F.2d at 239.
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plied by the refusal to apply it," especially in the area of foreign seizures,
because of the nonavailability of norms in this area.7 4 The act of state
doctrine thus prevents the risk of bias resulting from the partisan orienta-
tion of domestic courts. 75
From the viewpoint of international law, a more acceptable solution
to the act of state dilemma may be to apply the doctrine in all instances,
with no allowance for executive intervention, in order to assure deference
for the diverse policies espoused by the nations of the world and to pre-
vent nationalistic prejudices from entering into adjudication of acts of
state. An alternative solution is to allow domestic courts to apply and
develop fundamental international norms of conduct if there is a firm
consensus among dominant nations on appropriate norms. 76
Until the Supreme Court hands down a definitive decision on the
status of the act of state doctrine, courts will find themselves in the posi-
tion of the Lambom court, attempting to render a decision on the basis of
the doctrine itself, while simultaneously considering a list of exceptions,
some of which are based on questionable precedent. Until the Supreme
Court clarifies the limits of the act of state doctrine, however, lower
courts will have to continue deciding cases involving acts of state without
definitive guidance.
-ANNE CHARETTE HILL
74 R. Falk, supra note 30, at 107.
75 Id. at 106.
76 Id. at 136. An obvious difficulty in this approach, however, is the treatment of acts of
state of those nations not in agreement with the consensus of dominant powers.
